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HOW CAPITAL MARKETS CAN HELP 




Abstract: Climate change is exacerbating the frequency and severity of cata-
strophic weather events around the world. The economic impact of these 
events on developing countries can be severe, and roll back years of develop-
ment gains. To help face this growing challenge, the governments of develop-
ing countries need improved access to insurance and alternative risk transfer 
mechanisms to manage their exposure to climate risk. Multilateral develop-
ment banks, such as the World Bank, can help. For example, they can catalyze 
the creation of sovereign risk pools and facilitate access for developing coun-
try governments to the substantial reinsurance capacity of the capital markets. 
The World Bank’s role in creating the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance 
Facility, and the World Bank catastrophe bond issue in 2014 for that Facility, 
serve as models for this kind of assistance. In order to maximize the develop-
mental impact of these kinds of interventions, donor governments, acting 
through multilateral development banks, should encourage beneficiary coun-
tries to invest in ex ante climate risk preparedness and resilience as a condi-
tion of receiving this kind of development assistance.  
INTRODUCTION 
Recent international commitments made in the Addis Ababa Agenda for 
Action (agreed upon in July 2015) signal a new willingness on the part of 
governments around the world to acknowledge that disasters caused by ex-
treme weather events and the reality of climate change are inter-connected.1 
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 1 See U.N. Third International Conference on Financing for Development, Draft Resolution 
Submitted by the Chair of the Main Committee: Outcome Document of the Third International 
Conference on Financing for Development: Addis Ababa Action Agenda, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.227/L.1 (July 15, 2015) [https://perma.cc/FB7C-HD26] (original hyperlink no longer ac-
tive) (confirming that it is important to take account of climate and disaster resilience in develop-
ment financing and to invest in strengthening the ability of local and national actors to manage and 
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In line with this signal, both the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion (agreed upon in March 2015) (the “Sendai Framework”) and the Paris 
Agreement adopted at the twenty-first meeting of the Conference of the Par-
ties to the United Nations Framework Convention Climate Change (“UN-
FCCC” or the “Convention”) in December 2015 emphasize that disaster risk 
management is an integral part of managing climate change.2 Further, they 
recognize that developing countries need and deserve assistance with this 
task.3 The day of proactively managing the risk of loss from extreme weather 
events caused by climate change (hereafter referred to as climate risk) has 
arrived. 
Proactive climate risk management requires the party exposed to the risk 
to achieve a reasonable balance between risk reduction, retention, and trans-
fer.4 Most developing countries cannot achieve this balance alone.5 For sev-
eral reasons, including constrained resources, lack of risk transfer opportuni-
ties, and a reluctance to pay for insurance, most developing countries’ default 
                                                                                                                           
finance disaster risk); see also UNITED NATIONS, SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK RE-
DUCTION 2015–2030, at 9–10, ¶¶ 6–7, 9, 11 (n.d.) [hereinafter SENDAI FRAMEWORK], http://www.
preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRW2-UAR9] (em-
phasizing the need for improved coherence across policies, institutions, goals, indicators, and 
measurement systems). 
 2 See SENDAI FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 10, ¶ 11; see also U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement: Proposal by the President: Draft Decision -
/CP.21, 1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement], http://un
fccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GXK-6MB7] (adopting the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction). 
 3 See SENDAI FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 14, ¶ 19(m) (stating that developing countries, 
middle income countries, and other countries facing specific disaster challenges need adequate, 
sustainable, and timely provision of support). 
 4 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mechanisms to Manage Financial 
Risks from Direct Impacts of Climate Change: Technical Paper, at 4, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/
2008/9 (Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter UNFCCC Technical Paper], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2008/tp/09.pdf [https://perma.cc/88LL-VUZ2]. The Technical Paper was prepared at the sugges-
tion of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC, which 
requested that the Secretariat to the Convention prepare and make available for the Working 
Group’s consideration, a “technical paper on mechanisms, including innovative insurance tools, 
that [could] be used to manage financial risks from direct impacts of climate change in developing 
countries.” See id. 
 5 See J. DAVID CUMMINS & OLIVIER MAHUL, CATASTROPHE RISK FINANCING IN DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES: PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC INTERVENTION 47 (2009), http://siteresources.world
bank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/CATRISKbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EX5-W6KZ] 
(highlighting the importance of donor funding). The World Bank classifies countries’ economies 
annually into four categories: high income, upper middle income, middle income, and low in-
come, based on estimates of gross national income (“GNI”) per capita for the previous year; all 
but the high income countries qualify for World Bank assistance. See New Country Classifica-
tions, WORLD BANK (July 2, 2015), http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-country-classifications-
2015 [https://perma.cc/5MU5-DF8D]. Except where otherwise specified, the term developing 
countries as used in this Article refers to countries that qualify for World Bank assistance. 
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position is to over-retain.6 In doing so, they expose themselves to devastating 
losses and the vagaries of post-disaster humanitarian relief after a natural dis-
aster strikes. As extreme weather events become more frequent and increase 
in intensity, this pattern of developing countries failing to engage in ex ante 
risk management poses a significant threat to their economic well-being.7 The 
uninsured losses from one major catastrophe can roll back years of develop-
ment gains.8 Therefore, development assistance to help developing countries 
better manage this risk is crucial.9 Along with providing financial resources to 
reduce the risk, such assistance must include expanding developing countries’ 
opportunities to transfer a portion of the risk of loss from climate change off 
their balance sheets.10 
So what might development assistance in support of climate risk transfer 
look like? In June 2014, the World Bank (the “Bank”) launched a catastrophe 
bond on behalf of a sovereign climate risk insurance facility that is an exam-
ple of this kind of assistance.11 The bond is linked to the risk of earthquakes 
and tropical cyclones in sixteen Caribbean countries that face a constant 
threat of economic devastation from these extreme weather events, a threat 
now acknowledged to have intensified because of climate change.12 The bond 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See id. 
 7 See generally STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS., STORM ALERT: NATURAL DISAS-
TERS CAN DAMAGE SOVEREIGN CREDITWORTHINESS 16, 23 (2015) [hereinafter S&P 2015], 
http://unepfi.org/pdc/wp-content/uploads/StormAlert.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6A9-BGY4] (using 
the terms “developed” and “developing” to refer to the sub-groupings of countries put forward by 
the International Monetary Fund, which divides countries’ economies into “advanced economies” 
(“advanced sovereigns”), “emerging and developing economies,” and “low-income developing 
economies” (both of which constitute “developing sovereigns”)); see also UNFCCC Technical 
Paper, supra note 4, at 4, ¶ 4 (“Climate-related disasters represent a major source of risk to the 
poor in developing countries, and the losses caused are seen as a major threat to the achievement 
of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).”). The U.N. “Millennium Devel-
opment Goals” have been built upon, and are now known as the U.N. “Sustainable Development 
Goals.” See UNITED NATIONS, TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD: THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINA-
BLE DEVELOPMENT 3 (n.d.) https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030
%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3PC-VB5D]. 
 8 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 17, ¶ 76 (“Disasters often cause great social 
and economic devastation. The impacts of these events can set back the development process by 
years . . . .”). 
 9 See id. 
 10 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 2–3 (noting that the disaster risk management 
framework the World Bank and donor community support relies on three pillars: assessing the 
government’s contingent liability to natural disasters; enabling risk transfer; and financing sover-
eign risk). 
 11 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 67, ¶¶ 289–290; WORLD BANK, FACILITAT-
ING CATASTROPHE RISK TRANSFER (2014), http://treasury.worldbank.org/bdm/pdf/Case_Study/
Caribbean_CatastrophebondforCCRIF.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E9X-Q434]. 
 12 See CHRISTOPHER B. FIELD ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: SUMMARY FOR POLI-
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has the effect of enabling those countries’ governments to transfer some of 
that risk of economic loss to capital market investors.13 In broad brush terms, 
it ensures that a pooled sovereign risk facility, in which many Caribbean 
countries participate, will receive a significant and fast cash payout if any of 
the countries is hit by an earthquake or cyclone of a certain magnitude.14 On 
the other side of the equation, the bondholders will lose their right to receive 
some or all of their principal if such an event occurs.15 
This transfer of risk is accomplished by a composite of economic trans-
actions orchestrated by the World Bank and funded in large part by the devel-
opment aid resources of several donor countries.16 The first part of that com-
posite was the creation of an independent shared sovereign risk facility, the 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (“CCRIF”).17 The second part 
of the composite was the World Bank catastrophe bond that enabled the fa-
cility to access capital markets as a form of risk transfer.18 The Bank coupled 
its issuance of the bond with a swap transaction between itself and the facility 
through which the Bank hedged its exposure on the bond.19 
The question this Article examines is whether these interventions are 
model forms of development assistance that we should emulate in the future. 
On the one hand, the CCRIF and the World Bank catastrophe bond are on the 
cutting edge of development assistance with climate risk management.20 They 
give developing countries an opportunity to use financial mechanisms to pro-
actively manage the risk of economic loss from extreme weather events 
through risk transfer.21 On the other hand, the global financial crisis has 
                                                                                                                           
CYMAKERS 4, 6 ¶ A-1, 12 Assessment Box SPM.1 (n.d.) [hereinafter IPCC 2014], https://ipcc-
wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJM5-25R5] (indicat-
ing that recent extreme weather events have exposed significant vulnerability and exposure of some 
ecosystems and human systems to current climate variability and that moderate climate-change-
related risks from extreme weather events increase to high risks with one degree Celsius additional 
warming). 
 13 See WORLD BANK, supra note 11. 
 14 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 67, ¶¶ 289–290; WORLD BANK, supra note 
11. 
 15 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 75, ¶ 320(c). 
 16 See WORLD BANK, supra note 11. 
 17 See id. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See Michael Bennett, Disaster Risk, Using Capital Markets to Protect Against the Cost of 
Catastrophes, WORLD BANK: VOICES, PERSPECTIVES ON DEV. BLOG (Aug. 11, 2014), http://
blogs.worldbank.org/voices/disaster-risk-using-capital-markets-protect-against-cost-catastrophes 
[https://perma.cc/T53B-NKN8]. 
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taught us to be skeptical of the claims of new financial instruments.22 Finan-
cial markets have the capacity to transfer risk among parties, but not to elimi-
nate risks entirely. Therefore, with any risk-transferring financial instrument, 
it is important to understand where the risks end up and to assess whether 
those parties have the requisite capacity to bear those risks. Moreover, all in-
ternational organizations (and the World Bank can be no exception) have 
shown the capacity to pursue activities, which while generally well inten-
tioned, fail to achieve their goals.23 Further, scholars of the perverse incen-
tives that resulted from the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) 
might well question whether the World Bank’s catastrophe bond and the 
CCRIF could suffer from the same incentive problem. Unfortunately, under 
the NFIP, the U.S. Federal Government’s subsidization of flood insurance has 
ended up encouraging development and redevelopment in flood plains and 
inhibiting retreat, which, in the face of rising sea levels, is the kind of prudent 
adaptation that should and likely would happen if subsidized insurance were 
not available.24 
Analyzing the CCRIF and the World Bank catastrophe bond with these 
concerns in mind, we maintain that such interventions have a vital role to play 
in developing countries’ climate risk management, provided certain caveats 
are observed. Specifically, the legal agreements that underpin these interven-
tions should place clear and measurable demands on the countries that benefit 
from them to actively reduce their exposure to climate risk to an extent con-
sistent with each country’s level of development. In other words, as a condi-
tion of providing either direct or indirect assistance, donors and other devel-
opment assistance partners should require beneficiary countries to devise and 
maintain a robust national natural disaster risk management strategy aimed at 
reducing their exposure to climate risk, both by mitigation and improved re-
silience. This requirement should be reflected in all tiers of these interven-
tions, both in the terms and conditions of insurance coverage, and in the terms 
and conditions of any agreement providing for payments to be made by or to 
a third party to cover the costs of such coverage. All parties involved, both 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See generally THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RE-
FORM (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010) (noting how, throughout the 
1990s with the aid of de-regulation, investment and commercial banks turned the invention of new 
financial instruments into a major business, generating huge profits for themselves but ultimately 
exposing themselves, and the U.S. economy as a whole, to dangerous levels of credit risk). 
 23 See generally Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Patholo-
gies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999) (questioning whether international 
organizations really do what their creators intended them to do). 
 24 See J. Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTA-
TION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 267, 270 (Michael B. Gerrard & 
Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012). 
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public and private, must be part of both requiring robust climate risk man-
agement and policing compliance with any such requirements. 
The extent of such requirements should be scaled to be commensurate 
with each individual beneficiary country’s level of development, including 
the extent of financial resources it has available to devote to disaster risk pre-
paredness and resiliency. For example, while a middle income developing 
country may be required to have a comprehensive disaster risk management 
plan in place, lesser developed countries should be permitted to have imple-
mented less complete measures. Such scaling of requirements is essential to 
ensure that highly at-risk poor countries are not denied disaster risk manage-
ment assistance solely due to their understandable inability to fund and oper-
ate full scale risk management programs. 
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of the development assistance 
mandate to help developing countries proactively manage climate risk.25 Part 
II shows the role that capital market interventions—such as the Caribbean 
sovereign insurance risk pool and the related World Bank catastrophe bond—
can play in fulfilling that mandate.26 Part III discusses how future interven-
tions like the CCRIF and the World Bank catastrophe bond might increase 
their impact and strengthen their contribution to advancing both donor and 
recipient countries’ international commitments to address climate change and 
manage climate risk.27 
I. CLIMATE RISK MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The risk of significant loss from extreme weather events poses enor-
mous challenges for every country, but especially taxes the resources of de-
veloping countries that are poorly equipped both to manage the risk and to 
absorb the losses when the risk is realized.28 Donor countries have belatedly 
recognized the vast need these realities generate for development assistance 
that helps developing countries to actively manage this risk through risk 
transfer.29 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See infra notes 28–94 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 95–159 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 160–199 and accompanying text. 
 28 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 13. 
 29 See SENDAI FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 18–19, ¶¶ 29, 30(a)–(c). 
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A. Sovereign Climate Risk Management 
All countries need a range of financial mechanisms to manage their ex-
posure to climate risk.30 Ideally, a country will manage sovereign risk, includ-
ing climate risk, through a balanced mix of risk reduction, risk retention, and 
risk transfer.31 Sovereign risk reduction entails government policies that re-
duce the risk that an event that causes loss will occur, and policies that limit 
the amount of loss that will be sustained if such an event does occur.32 Exam-
ples include a government investing in more resilient infrastructure as well as 
promulgating regulations that promote resilience, such as enacting and en-
forcing stricter building codes. Risk retention involves the government ab-
sorbing the risk itself.33 If retained risk is realized, the resulting losses are 
covered out of the government’s budget resources.34 
Countries retain risk in different ways. Retention may involve creating a 
separate reserve fund dedicated to funding post-catastrophe relief and recon-
struction or contracting for contingent loan financing.35 Risk transfer involves 
transferring the risk to a third party for a price.36 The most common form of 
risk transfer consists of obtaining insurance.37 Risk may, however, also be 
securitized and transferred to capital market investors through financial in-
struments, a method referred to as alternative risk transfer (“ART”).38 In the 
case of climate risk, ART may involve catastrophe bonds.39 
The availability of opportunities to transfer climate risk to third parties 
depends on the nature of the risk involved. For example, the risk posed by 
events that are frequent but limited in impact—such as frequent low intensity 
storms in an area prone to tropical storms—is amenable to traditional insur-
ance because the scale and probability of loss are predictable and tend to be 
distributed over a diversified group of insureds.40 The frequency of the storms 
enables an insurer to accumulate experience forecasting both the timing and 
the degree of loss that can be expected.41 With this information, an insurer 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 69–86 ¶¶ 298–377 (providing information 
on the financial mechanism used to manage risks from direct impacts of climate change). 
 31 See id. at 70, ¶¶ 300–303. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. at 74, ¶ 320(b). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See id. at 44, ¶ 179. 
 39 See id. at 75, ¶ 320(b). 
 40 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 187 app.8 (noting that insurance works best for 
high-frequency, low-severity events, which are statistically independent and have probability 
distributions that are reasonably stationary over time). 
 41 See id. at 188. 
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can quantify with a reasonable degree of certainty how much the high fre-
quency storms will cost it in terms of expected pay-outs on an annualized 
basis. 
In contrast, the risk of major loss from high intensity, infrequent storms 
exposes insurance companies to large and unpredictable levels of loss. As a 
result, there is a need for significant reinsurance capacity to address these 
events.42 The capital markets can provide some of this reinsurance capacity in 
the form of catastrophe bonds. Capital market investors have both the will 
and the capacity to absorb the unpredictability of catastrophic risk.43 
B. Developing Countries’ Challenges 
Every step of the climate risk management process presents particular 
challenges for developing countries. Currently, developing countries primari-
ly rely on risk retention, counting on budget re-allocations and externally 
provided disaster response aid to deal with losses from natural disasters.44 
Risk reduction efforts require resources and strong government, both of 
which may be in short supply in many countries most at risk to extreme 
weather events.45 Further, even where a developing country might be interest-
ed in transferring this risk to a third party, opportunities for most developing 
countries to make such a transfer are severely limited.46 
Risk transfer opportunities are limited in developing countries both at 
the local and sovereign level.47 Property and casualty insurance, the most 
common form of climate risk transfer in developed countries, are not com-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See id. at 79 (noting that the efficient financing of natural disasters relies on a public-
private partnership between the private insurance, reinsurance industry, and governments); id. at 
185 app.8 (noting that insurers are critically dependent on the global reinsurance market to pro-
vide coverage and claims for losses suffered from extreme weather events of the magnitude in-
curred in the United States during the 2004 and 2005 hurricane season). 
 43 See generally Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of 
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 503–05 (2005) (ex-
plaining that the key difference between insurance and insurance-linked securities is that insurance 
and reinsurance markets provide catastrophic risk coverage whereas insurance-linked securities 
provide additional financial capacity). 
 44 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 19, ¶ 84; CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 
5, at 47. 
 45 See UNFCCC Technical Paper supra note 4, at 62, 69, ¶¶ 270, 292 (noting that external 
support to the most vulnerable countries for national-level catastrophe insurance is essential and 
that there are significant barriers to the use of insurance in developing countries, including the fact 
that their financial systems are generally weak). 
 46 See id. at 12, ¶ 46. 
 47 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 96 (noting that a lack of data and catastrophe risk 
modelling in low and middle income countries limits the ability of governments and domestic 
insurers to access global reinsurance). 
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mon in developing countries.48 For example, more than 40% of the direct 
losses from natural disasters are insured in developed countries, usually 
through compulsory insurance.49 In contrast, it is estimated that less than 10% 
of these losses are covered by insurance in middle-income countries and less 
than 5% in low-income countries.50 
Both supply- and demand-side barriers impede more extensive insurance 
coverage in developing countries.51 Supply-side barriers include a poorly de-
veloped financial sector in rural areas where access to banking and financial 
advice is rare.52 The uncertainty of a commercial return and the lack of suffi-
cient data and modeling on hazards and exposures have also made private 
insurers reluctant to engage in assuming climate risk in developing coun-
tries.53 On the demand side, a lack of familiarity with insurance and low risk 
awareness stifle demand.54 
The low level of property and casualty insurance in developing countries 
exacerbates their vulnerability to catastrophic loss from climate change.55 In 
the absence of such insurance, the financial burden of natural disasters falls 
on the government, which will be forced to re-allocate meager budget re-
sources to finance disaster response and recovery.56 At the same time, follow-
ing a disaster government revenues usually fall because of decreased eco-
nomic activity.57 The scope of this exposure makes it critical for developing 
countries’ governments to transfer some or all of this risk to third parties.58 
Yet the obstacles that result in a low level of property and casualty insurance 
in developing countries operate with even greater force to impede would-be 
insurers and third parties from assuming sovereign catastrophic climate risk.59 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. at 71 (showing low non-life insurance penetration in developing countries). 
 49 See id. at 5. 
 50 See id. (indicating that under-insurance is a direct consequence of the underdeveloped non-
life insurance markets: the insurance penetration, measured as a percentage of gross domestic 
product, is 1.4% in Latin America and Africa, compared to 3% in Europe and almost 5% in North 
America). 
 51 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 46, ¶ 188. 
 52 See id. at 47–48, ¶ 190. 
 53 See id. at 48–49, ¶¶ 192–193, 196, 198–199. 
 54 See id. at 49–50, ¶¶ 202–204. 
 55 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that in low and middle income coun-
tries, most direct losses from natural disasters are not covered by insurance, and development of 
efficient catastrophic insurance markets is undermined by low non-life insurance penetration, 
inadequate awareness of catastrophic risk exposure, and limited ability to pay insurance premi-
ums). 
 56 See Bennet, supra note 21. 
 57 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 48. 
 58 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 62, ¶¶ 268–270. 
 59 See id. at 30, ¶ 135 (a) (noting that problems arise in setting up risk transfer schemes where 
ownership is difficult to establish and damage is difficult to quantify). 
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On the demand side, a lack of modeling of climate-related hazard behav-
ior and asset vulnerability results in widespread unawareness on the part of 
developing countries of the extent of their catastrophic risk exposure.60 Lack-
ing that awareness, governments are reluctant to incur the cost of the insur-
ance premiums that would be required to insure this risk.61 Further, they may 
invest in disaster insurance for a period but subsequently lose interest if a few 
years go by without any natural disaster occurring.62 On the supply side, a 
lack of modeling and dearth of data precludes would-be insurers and other 
third parties from engaging with developing countries on reinsurance and 
capital market instruments, which the management of catastrophic risk re-
quires.63 In order for any third party to be willing to assume transferred risk, 
that risk has to be packaged in a way that enables the third party to adequately 
analyze and price it. 
The scope of developing countries’ exposure to the risk of catastrophic 
loss from climate change that results from their inability to transfer that risk 
to third parties could have devastating consequences for the countries con-
cerned.64 Although, in absolute terms, the costliest disasters occur mainly in 
developed countries, which have the highest concentration of assets, small 
and less developed economies experience the largest losses as measured by 
the effect on their gross domestic product (GDP).65 The record shows a close 
connection between a country’s economic well-being and the extent of its 
vulnerability to the risk of catastrophic loss from climate change.66 Many de-
veloping countries faced frequent losses from natural hazards even without 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
 61 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 66, ¶ 285. 
 62 See id. at 67, ¶ 291. 
 63 See id. at 48, ¶ 196. 
 64 See S&P 2015, supra note 7, at 16 (indicating that a country’s level of economic develop-
ment is inversely correlated to the impact of a natural disaster on the country’s rating, either due to 
existing economic and financial vulnerabilities or the state of development of the insurance market 
in the country). Using the subgroupings of sovereigns put forward by the International Monetary 
Fund, the countries whose ratings would be most affected by a natural disaster would be low-
income sovereigns, with an estimated decline in income per capita of more than 5% over 2016–
2020 compared with the baseline scenario. See id. Emerging and other developing sovereigns 
would on average suffer a decline in per capita income of almost 3% compared with the baseline, 
while advanced sovereigns display much more resilience, with a 0.7% decline. See id. 
 65 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 14–16. The poorest developing countries, namely 
the Least Developed Countries (“LDCs”), the Small Island Developing States (“SIDs”), and coun-
tries in Africa, are the most vulnerable. See id.; see also UNFCCC Technical Paper, at 4, 18, ¶¶ 1, 
79 (noting that the sub-groups of LDCs and SIDs refer to groupings used by the World Bank and 
that Africa is home to thirty-two LDCs whose economies depend more heavily on agriculture than 
the economies of other regions of the world). 
 66 See S&P 2015, supra note 7, at 16; see also UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 
28, ¶ 125 (defining vulnerability in this context as the “degree to which a system is susceptible, 
and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change”). 
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climate change. Anthropogenic climate change, however, exacerbates old 
hazards and generates new ones, affecting a wide range of developing coun-
tries’ assets including human, physical, and socioeconomic assets, and causes 
widespread indirect losses.67 These harsh realities make development assis-
tance with climate risk transfer critically important. 
C. Development Assistance for Climate Risk Management 
Historically, development assistance to help developing countries to 
manage climate risk through risk transfer has been sparse.68 Until recently, 
disasters caused by extreme weather events were viewed as an unexpected 
interruption in development rather than an expected risk.69 Donor (and recipi-
ent) countries saw the risk of catastrophic loss from climate change as a high 
cost but low probability risk.70 And governments, like most individuals, are 
disinclined to proactively manage (or help other governments to manage) low 
probability risks.71 Thus, donors viewed the costs of creating an insurance 
infrastructure in countries with a weak financial sector as prohibitively bur-
densome.72 Development assistance for climate change and development as-
                                                                                                                           
 67 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 21, ¶¶ 94–95. The hazards exacerbated 
and/or caused by anthropogenic climate change are grouped into three broad categories: acute 
hazards, which are severe hazards with a short time frame (e.g., floods); chronic hazards that have 
a gradual impact (such as sea level rise); and second order hazards (such as reduced access to 
water) which are caused by the impact of the changing climate on human or natural systems. See 
id. 
 68 See id. at 4, ¶ 4 (emphasizing the critical need to create financial risk-sharing and risk-
management approaches and mechanisms that can help developing countries to reduce their vul-
nerability to the impacts of climate change). 
 69 See id. at 19, ¶ 84 (“Disaster is still sometimes treated as an unexpected interruption to 
development rather than as an expected risk.”). 
 70 See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 235–36 
(2013); David Minkow, How the Public Underestimates the Risk of Climate Change: Interview with 
Paul Slovic, CLIMATEACCESS (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.climateaccess.org/blog/how-public-
perceives-risks-climate-change-interview-paul-slovic [https://perma.cc/Z9H9-TWJY]. In this regard, 
there has been a prolonged disconnect between the views of governments and the general public on 
the one hand, and the views of climate scientists on the other, who have been warning about the in-
creasing threat of catastrophic loss from climate change for several years. See Minkow, supra. 
 71 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268 (1979) (detailing the phenomenon of myopic loss aversion 
which shows that consumers are more likely to take an uncertain risk than to suffer a certain loss 
in the form of a premium payment). 
 72 See UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 53, ¶ 218 (explaining that micro-insurance 
and weather index insurance emerged as potential ways of increasing the use of insurance as a 
climate risk management tool). Both micro-insurance and weather index insurance require sub-
stantial government involvement, at least at the initial stages, which is not always feasible to 
achieve. See id. at 53–56, ¶¶ 220–234. For example, to support micro-insurance, governments 
have to build the expertise and capacity to regulate the micro-insurers. See id. Donors have to 
invest substantially in capacity-building at both the micro-insurer and the supervisory level for 
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sistance for disaster relief occurred in separate silos. Neither silo addressed 
the need to assist developing countries with managing climate risk through 
risk transfer. 
The climate change assistance silo focused on funding developing coun-
tries’ adaptation and mitigation efforts to further the obligations assumed un-
der the UNFCCC.73 Funding for adaptation efforts included funding for dis-
aster management and early warning signals, but not efforts to transfer the 
risk from government. The first global collective effort to provide develop-
ment assistance for climate change was the Global Environment Facility 
(“GEF”), established in 1992 to serve as the financing mechanism of the UN-
FCCC.74 GEF funding covers the additional costs associated with transform-
ing a project with national environmental benefits into a project with global 
environmental benefits.75 GEF grants to cover the costs of addressing the im-
pact of climate change have emphasized funding sustainable transport, re-
newable energy, land use and forestry projects, and projects that protect car-
bon sinks.76 
Several collective financing efforts to fund developing countries’ 
measures to address climate change followed the GEF, including the Least 
Developed Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Adaptation 
Fund, the Climate Investment Funds, and a series of World Bank carbon 
funds. Like the GEF, these efforts have funded projects and programs to 
achieve adaptation and mitigation and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But, 
                                                                                                                           
micro-insurance to be offered in a way that incentivizes adaptation. See id. Governments, donors, 
and micro-insurers also have to assume a role in promoting insurance awareness and education. 
See id. Governments also establish the regulatory environment for index insurance. See id. Fur-
ther, governmental meteorological services are the basis for weather index insurance’s design and 
implementation. See id. Thus, jump-starting and maintaining the conditions that allow for index 
insurance also place demands on a country’s public resources and, by extension, on sources of 
development assistance. See id. 
 73 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, May 8, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (stating the commitment of developed country parties to the Con-
vention to provide financial resources to help cover the costs incurred by developing countries in 
complying with their obligations under the Convention). 
 74 See What Is the GEF?, GLOB. ENV’T FACILITY, https://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef [https://
perma.cc/JT4C-Z5FJ]. 
 75 See id. (discussing how the GEF gathers funds to “tackle our planet’s most pressing envi-
ronmental problems”). 
 76 See id.; see also UNFCCC Technical Paper, supra note 4, at 63, ¶ 275 (noting that GEF 
funding has included forms of technical assistance that enhance countries’ capacity to manage the 
risk of climate change, such as the conduct of feasibility studies and risk assessments, but on a 
relatively small scale). 
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historically, they have not funded developing countries’ efforts to manage 
climate risk through risk transfer.77 
In the disaster reduction silo, development assistance consisted primarily 
of providing assistance after a disaster occurred.78 Such assistance came at 
the expense of other goals, as disaster-related external assistance was usually 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), GLOB. ENV’T FACILITY, https://www.the
gef.org/gef/LDCF [https://perma.cc/P55M-Y7JQ]. The Least Developed Countries Fund finances 
the preparation and implementation of least developed countries’ national adaptation programs of 
action under the UNFCCC. See id. Such plans include disaster management and early warning 
systems. See U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, NATIONAL 
ADAPTATION PROGRAMMES OF ACTION: INDEX OF NAPA PROJECTS BY SECTOR 13–25 (2013), 
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_portal/napa_priorities_datab
ase/application/pdf/napa_index_by_sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT3B-5TMB]. For these purpos-
es, disaster management includes taking operational measures to adapt, such as, for example, 
improving crop production by appropriate technologies. See, e.g., REPUBLIC OF MALAWI, MALA-
WI’S NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMMES OF ACTION (NAPA): UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC): FIRST EDITION 13–15 (2006), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/mwi01.pdf [https://perma.cc/66CU-FPQR]. Disaster man-
agement, however, did not originally include pursuing disaster risk management measures such as 
providing for risk transfer through financial instruments. See GLOB. ENV’T FACILITY, PROGRESS 
REPORT ON THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES FUND AND THE SPECIAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
FUND 23 (2014), https://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF-LDCF.SCCF_.
17-03,%20Progress%20Report%20on%20the%20LDCF%20and%20the%20SCCF,%202014-10-
08.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUH7-VLUN] (describing how the Special Climate Change Fund has 
directed its funding at projects primarily in the areas of agriculture, enhanced resilience in water 
resource management, coastal zone management, and technology transfer); U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, supra; Funds & Programs, CLIMATE INV. 
FUNDS, https://www-cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/fund/clean-technology-fund [https://perma.
cc/82LE-UNY8] (noting that the Climate Investment Fund’s resources are divided up between 
four focus areas: clean technology, forest investment, pilot programs for climate resilience, and 
renewable energy scale-up); Projects and Programmes: All Funded Projects, ADAPTATION FUND, 
https://www.adaptation-fund.org/projects-programmes/ [https://perma.cc/LL7Y-AUCV] (describ-
ing how the Adaptation Fund established finances projects and programs to help vulnerable com-
munities in developing countries adapt to climate change; such programs and projects concentrate 
on on-the-ground operational measures (such as climate proofing) to strengthen communities’ 
adaptive capacity and resilience); Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), GLOB. ENV’T FACILITY, 
https://www.thegef.org/gef/SCCF [https://perma.cc/QE2J-2E2N] (stating that the Special Climate 
Change Fund was established in 2001 to support adaptation and technology transfer in all develop-
ing countries party to the UNFCCC); World Bank Carbon Funds and Facilities, WORLD BANK 
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/world-bank-carbon-funds-
facilities [https://perma.cc/6BD6-7K3E]. The World Bank manages a cluster of carbon funds and 
facilities that purchase project-based greenhouse gas emission reductions in developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition on behalf of the funds’ contributors. World Bank Car-
bon Funds and Facilities, supra. The most recent initiatives aim to scale up emission reductions, 
focus on readiness for market-based carbon initiatives, increase access to energy in least devel-
oped countries, and reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Id. 
 78 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 13 (noting a shift in donors’ focus from provid-
ing post-disaster assistance to promoting proactive disaster risk management). 
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not incremental, but tended to displace funding for development.79 Yet donor 
and recipient countries seemed more willing to provide and receive relief aid 
than to invest in disaster reduction activities.80 This pattern persisted despite 
findings that climate-related catastrophes can stall, and indeed undo, efforts to 
reduce poverty.81 
The World Conference on Disaster Reduction convened by the U.N. 
General Assembly in 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan marked a turning point in 
this pattern.82 At the conference, 168 participant countries agreed upon a 
blueprint for disaster reduction efforts and adopted a ten-year plan to make 
the world safer from natural disasters.83 The agreement, known as the Hyogo 
Framework, identified the need to promote financial risk-sharing mecha-
nisms, particularly insurance and reinsurance against disasters, as a priority 
for building the capacity of nations and communities to cope with natural dis-
aster losses.84 
Following the adoption of the Hyogo Framework, the need to integrate 
assistance for natural disaster relief with assistance to address the impacts of 
climate change, and to include climate risk management as a target of such 
assistance, gradually emerged as a priority. In 2011, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) issued a special report on Managing the 
Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adapta-
tion (the “2011 IPCC Special Report”), which recommended integrating de-
velopment assistance with governmental disaster risk management and cli-
mate adaptation policy.85 The 2011 IPCC Special Report also recommended 
that development assistance promote risk-sharing and transfer mechanisms.86 
In March 2015, the signatory countries of the Hyogo Framework re-
placed it with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Reduction for the period 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See id. at 5 (noting that if not immediate, displacement would usually be experienced over a 
period of one to two years). 
 80 See BRIDGETTE LEONI ET AL., U.N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER RELIEF (UNISDR), 
DISASTER THROUGH A DIFFERENT LENS 62 (n.d.), http://www.unisdr.org/files/20108_mediabook.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5R7W-ZL5E] (noting that an effect of climate-related disasters is to rein-
force chronic poverty); Eric Werker, Disaster Politics, HARV. INT’L REV. (Aug. 23, 2010), http://
hir.harvard.edu/disaster-politics/ [https://perma.cc/FZ7Z-YMV9] (discussing the tendency of coun-
tries to rely on relief aid and under-invest in disaster prevention). 
 81 See LEONI ET AL., supra note 80. 
 82 See U.N. World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–
2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.206/6 (Jan. 2005) [hereinafter “Hyogo”]. 
 83 See G.A. Res. 58/214, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/214 (Dec. 23, 2003). 
 84 See Hyogo, supra note 82, at 11. 
 85 See IPCC, MANAGING THE RISK, supra note 72, at 3–5. 
 86 See id. at 321. 
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2015–2030.87 They took note of findings on the implementation of Hyogo, 
showing that reducing disaster risk is a cost-effective investment in prevent-
ing future losses.88 They also took note of findings showing that effective risk 
management contributes to sustainable development.89 Echoing the recom-
mendations of the 2011 IPCC Special Report, the Sendai Framework express-
ly advocates integrating global efforts to improve disaster risk reduction and 
management with efforts to address development and climate change.90 
This expansion of development priorities to include climate risk man-
agement has now spilled over into donors’ collective efforts to fund develop-
ing countries’ measures to protect the global environment. Donors’ collective 
funding efforts to address climate change, including the GEF, have been 
dwarfed by the Green Climate Fund, established by the Seventeenth Confer-
ence of the Parties of the UNFCCC in late 2011, which began operations in 
2014.91 Its goal is to transfer $100 billion (comprised of public and private 
funds) annually to developing countries to promote low emission and climate 
resilient development.92 Assistance for climate resilient development is clear-
ly broad enough to encompass assistance with managing the risk of loss from 
extreme weather events through risk transfer. Recent trends also indicate that, 
for the future, climate risk management will be included as a target of all de-
velopment assistance for climate change. For example, the GEF plans to tar-
get $1.4 billion towards enhanced resilience, adaptation, and disaster risk re-
duction in its current funding cycle.93 The least Developed Countries Fund 
now also includes disaster risk management (and not simply disaster man-
agement) as a priority need.94 
II. CLIMATE RISK MANAGEMENT AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
Now that developed and developing countries recognize the importance 
of development assistance for climate risk management, such assistance must 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See G.A. Res. 66/199, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/199 (Feb. 28, 2012). 
 88 See SENDAI FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 9, ¶ 3. 
 89 See id. 
 90 See id. at 10–11, ¶¶ 4–6, 13, 47 (noting that disasters, many of which are exacerbated by 
climate change, impede progress towards development and addressing climate change as one of 
the drivers of disaster risk is an opportunity to reduce disaster risk in a meaningful and coherent 
manner). 
 91 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, 55–57, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012). 
 92 See id. at ann.I, ¶ 3. 
 93 Climate Change: Main Issues, GLOB. ENV’T FACILITY, https://www.thegef.org/gef/climate_
change [https://perma.cc/YZ28-7RM6]. 
 94 See Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), supra note 77 (noting that the Fund focuses 
on reducing the vulnerability of those sectors and resources that are central to development and 
livelihood, including disaster risk management and prevention). 
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include assistance with finding opportunities to transfer the risk to third par-
ties. These opportunities are a key component of sovereign climate risk man-
agement that eludes developing countries.95 The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk 
Insurance Facility (“CCRIF”), and the World Bank catastrophe bond issued 
on the CCRIF’s behalf, are examples of the kind of development assistance 
interventions that accomplish that goal.96 These interventions package devel-
oping country climate risk in a manner that allows the risk to be assumed by 
third parties.97 
A. The Role of Sovereign Climate Risk Pools 
Sovereign risk financing, which allows countries to secure access to fi-
nancial resources when a natural disaster hits, is particularly necessary for 
countries for which potential losses caused by natural disasters are large rela-
tive to their national economies, or where the cost of mobilizing post-disaster 
funding is high.98 Developing countries have difficulty obtaining sovereign 
risk financing in the private market.99 Insurers may worry that changing 
budget priorities and political regimes make developing countries govern-
ments’ commitments to pay their premiums unreliable over the long term.100 
The pooling of sovereign risk into regional catastrophe insurance pools helps 
to assuage these concerns. Regional pools can also enable developing coun-
tries to access the reinsurance markets.101 The sponsors of the CCRIF pio-
neered funding a developing country climate risk management pool with the 
goal of obtaining these advantages on the participant countries’ behalf.102 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 39–48 (noting that the development of catastro-
phe insurance and reinsurance markets in low- and middle-income countries is impeded by a vari-
ety of demand- and supply-side market imperfections). 
 96 Press Release, World Bank Treasury, World Bank Issues Its First Ever Catastrophe Bond 
Linked to Natural Hazard Risks in Sixteen Caribbean Countries (June 30, 2014), http://treasury.world
bank.org/cmd/htm/FirstCatBondLinkedToNaturalHazards.html [https://perma.cc/YC6K-DNR8]. 
 97 See generally id. (highlighting the CCRIF’s reinsurance model and its benefits). 
 98 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 162. 
 99 See id. at 40 (noting that the underdeveloped state of low- and middle-income countries’ 
non-life insurance markets makes it difficult to develop comprehensive risk financing strategies 
for government and private consumers, making outside assistance necessary to help catalyze ca-
tastrophe risk coverage). 
 100 See id. at 29. 
 101 See id. at 24 (noting that donor-supported catastrophe insurance pools can offer policies 
issued in primary insurance markets, provide liquidity to governments following catastrophes, and 
facilitate the transfer of risk to global reinsurance and capital markets). 
 102 See id. 
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The CCRIF was the first multi-country insurance fund in the world.103 It 
emerged as a response to devastation caused by hurricanes in the Caribbean 
in 2004, after which the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(“CARICOM”) Heads of Government asked the World Bank for assistance to 
gain access to affordable, fast-disbursing disaster risk financing.104 Caribbean 
countries cannot spread risk geographically because of their small size, or 
over time (through borrowing) because of their high debt levels.105 But a fea-
sibility study, financed with development assistance funds from Japan, 
showed that because of their particular geographic location, two or more is-
lands are rarely affected by the same hurricane.106 Accordingly, the region 
provides a reasonably diversified portfolio of risk, amenable to being aggre-
gated into a single pool.107 
The CCRIF constitutes that single shared sovereign risk pool, aggregat-
ing Caribbean countries’ exposure to the risk of loss from hurricanes and 
earthquakes.108 It mitigates the short-term cash flow problems that its benefi-
ciary countries suffer after major natural disasters by providing rapid payouts 
to help finance their initial disaster response and maintain basic government 
functions after a catastrophic event.109 The payouts are relatively rapid be-
cause they are based on a parametric model whereby payments are automatic 
on the occurrence of certain trigger events identified in the terms of the cov-
erage, rather than being based upon an assessment of loss actually sus-
tained.110 
                                                                                                                           
 103 About Us, CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INS. FACILITY, http://www.ccrif.org/content/
about-us [https://perma.cc/JQS8-78WK]. 
 104 Memorandum from the President, World Bank, to the Executive Directors, Proposed 
Transfer of IBRD Surplus to Support a Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility 1 (Feb. 9, 
2007) [hereafter “IBRD Board Paper February 2007”]; WORLD BANK, PROJECT APPRAISAL DOC-
UMENT ON A PROPOSED GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 6 MILLION (US $9 MILLION EQUIVA-
LENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR A HAITI CATASTROPHIC INSURANCE PROJECT 15 (2007), 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/02/21/000020439_20
070221163058/Rendered/PDF/38540.pdf. 
 105 See WORLD BANK, supra note 104, at 1 (using Haiti as an example). 
 106 See id. at 15. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See Memorandum from the President, World Bank, to the Executive Directors, Proposed 
Trust Fund for the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility 1, ¶ 1 (Mar. 6, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter “Proposed Trust Fund for CCRIF”], http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS
ContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/03/08/000020439_20070308113842/Rendered/PDF/38927.pdf. 
 109 See About Us, supra note 103 (“Since the inception of CCRIF in 2007, the facility has 
made 13 payouts for hurricanes, earthquakes and excess rainfall, to 8 member governments total-
ing approximately US$38 million to eight member governments.”). 
 110 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at xxiii (“Parametric Insurance makes indemnity 
payments based not on an assessment of the policyholder’s individual loss, but rather on measures 
of a parametric index that is assumed to proxy actual losses.”). 
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With development assistance funds from the European Union, the Car-
ibbean Development Bank, several donor governments, and some of its own 
funds, the World Bank established the facility as a special purpose insurance 
entity under Cayman law, owned by a trust that is also established and regis-
tered under Cayman law.111 Donors’ contributions funded both the establish-
ment costs and the first few years of the facility’s operating expenditures.112 
Countries insured by the facility pay an initiation fee and annual premiums, 
the amount of which is adjusted according to each country’s individual risk 
profile.113 The poorer beneficiary countries paid their initiation fees and first 
three years’ premiums with funds provided by the International Development 
Association, the arm of the World Bank Group established to provide low 
interest loans to the world’s poorest countries.114 
From the beginning, the CCRIF’s sponsors intended the facility to be-
come self-sustaining within five years.115 They intended their contributions to 
catalyze the private sector to become involved and viewed their initial finan-
cial support as helping to resolve what they perceived to be a temporary mar-
ket failure.116 To pave the way for a gradual transition to a wholly private en-
tity, the facility’s governance structure was dominated by the private sector.117 
A board of directors governed the facility, composed of four representatives 
drawn from the private banking, insurance, and risk management sectors, 
along with a CARICOM appointee (representing the interests of the partici-
pating countries) and a Caribbean Development appointee (representing do-
nor countries).118 A captive manager, drawn from the private sector and an-
swerable to the board, managed the facility’s day-to-day operations.119 In due 
course, the facility engaged a facility supervisor, insurance manager, asset 
                                                                                                                           
 111See WORLD BANK, supra note 104, at 3. 
 112 See id. In addition to Japan, donor governments included the Governments of Canada, 
United Kingdom, France, Ireland, and Bermuda. See id. at 2, ¶¶ 4–5. 
 113 See IBRD Board Paper February 2007, supra note 104, at 10. 
 114 See Proposed Trust Fund for CCRIF, supra note 108, at 2, ¶ 2. The International Devel-
opment Association (IDA), a separate international organization from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), played a key role in assisting Caribbean countries in the 
development of the CCRIF. See id. Haiti, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and the 
Grenadines received such assistance from the IDA. See id. 
 115 See id. at 2, ¶ 6. 
 116 See id. at 2, ¶¶ 5–6 (noting that while donor support was essential for establishing the 
CCRIF, the facility was expected to become self-sustaining over time). 
 117 See IBRD Board Paper February 2007, supra note 104, at 10–11. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See id. at 11. 
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manager, reinsurance broker, and communications manager, all drawn from 
the private sector.120 
The facility has been hailed as an effective use of development assis-
tance resources because it catalyzed the creation of a self-sustaining entity 
that met a strong development need: Caribbean countries’ need for insurance 
against loss from extreme weather events.121 Since 2014, it has functioned 
without contributions from the World Bank or other external contributors to 
its operating capital.122 It has re-structured from a trust and captive special 
purpose entity to become a segregated portfolio company.123 Further, it has 
expanded to offer coverage to Central American countries.124 It has also ex-
panded its coverage options to include excess rainfall coverage.125 
B. The Role of Catastrophe Bonds 
The CCRIF’s sponsors always envisaged a sovereign risk insurance fa-
cility that would become self-sustaining in due course.126 At the same time, 
the sponsors recognized that the facility’s sustainability would depend on its 
ability to transfer some of its financial risk to the international capital markets 
through reinsurance and/or alternative risk transfer mechanisms, such as ca-
tastrophe bonds.127 The three-year $30 million catastrophe bond the World 
Bank issued in June 2014 aims to further that goal.128 
Catastrophe bonds help private entities, countries, and sovereign risk 
management facilities, such as the CCRIF, manage their exposure to cata-
strophic loss by enabling the transfer of that risk to private investors in the 
capital markets.129 The advantage of a catastrophe bond is that it provides for 
a non-contingent, non-reimbursable infusion of liquidity to a country experi-
encing a specified climate event of a specified magnitude, designated in the 
bond documentation as a trigger.130 Like the insurance provided by the 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See generally CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INS. FACILITY, CCRIF ANNUAL REPORT 
FOR 2009–2010 (2010) (acknowledging throughout the importance of each of these roles). 
 121 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 102 (citing the CCRIF as an illustration of a 
successful regional risk aggregator vehicle). 
 122 See About Us, supra note 103. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. (noting the expansion to include Nicaragua, the first Central American government 
to become a CCRIF member). 
 125 See id. 
 126 See Proposed Trust Fund for CCRIF, supra note 108, at 2, ¶ 6. 
 127 See IBRD Board Paper February 2007, supra note 104, at 10; WORLD BANK, supra note 
104, at 3, 9. 
 128 See Bennett, supra note 21. 
 129 See CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 5, at 214–15. 
 130 See id. at 212–32; Christopher Kampa, Alternative Risk Transfer: The Convergence of the 
Insurance and Capital Markets, Part II, INS. STUDIES INST., July 28, 2010, at 3–4. For an excel-
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CCRIF, the liquidity infusion provided by the bonds is based on parametric 
insurance, not actual loss.131 For this reason, the coverage may well fall far 
short of the loss actually sustained.132 Nonetheless, these bonds play a useful 
role in a country or entity’s overall climate risk management portfolio. 
Catastrophe bonds can be an effective form of risk transfer because they 
have a high market appeal to a particular investor base, despite their inherent 
riskiness (given the vagaries of the extreme weather events they rely upon as 
triggers).133 They are marketed to a limited set of institutional investors with 
expertise in evaluating insurance risk.134 Over the last decade, these bonds 
have become an increasingly important part of the global reinsurance market, 
as they now represent about 15% of the total volume of global catastrophe 
reinsurance.135 
Catastrophe bonds based on developing country climate risk have a par-
ticular appeal because the risks covered by catastrophe bonds have tended to 
be “highly concentrated in a small number of perils—hurricanes in southeast-
ern United States, earthquakes in California, windstorms in Europe and 
earthquakes in Japan.”136 Indeed, the market data shows that investor demand 
for catastrophe bonds referencing other risks is so strong that investors will 
accept a lower interest rate on these bonds than they will accept on bonds 
with an equivalent level of risk that reference the main perils in the market.137 
Accordingly, catastrophe bonds have significant potential to serve as a cost-
effective way for developing countries to manage their exposure to climate 
risk. 
Without development assistance, however, many developing countries 
cannot avail of the opportunity to transfer climate risk to the market that this 
investor demand presents.138 Most developing countries’ governments face 
                                                                                                                           
lent treatment of the regulatory issues posed by catastrophe bonds, see Qihao He, Climate Change 
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 131 See WORLD BANK, supra note 11. 
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significant barriers to entry into this market.139 Government officials tend to 
lack familiarity with reinsurance in general and the catastrophe bond market 
in particular.140 Further, modeling of the natural disaster risk exposure of 
many countries is either limited or non-existent, which makes the private fi-
nancial sector unwilling to engage.141 The intervention of an institution like 
the World Bank, or other international development bank, however, can over-
come these barriers. Developing countries’ need of that intervention creates 
an opportunity for the intervening institution to condition its intervention on 
the developing country’s agreeing to undertake sound climate risk manage-
ment practices.142 Understanding how the opportunity to demand sound risk 
management as a quid pro quo for issuing a catastrophe bond on a country’s 
behalf arises requires understanding how a catastrophe bond works. 
There are several steps in the workings of a catastrophe bond. Briefly, in 
a typical catastrophe bond structure in the private sector, the entity exposed to 
the risk of catastrophic loss—frequently an insurance company, which, in 
return for a premium, assumes the risk from the business that is actually ex-
posed to physical harm—enters into an insurance contract with a special pur-
pose vehicle (“SPV”) created for the sole purpose of issuing catastrophe 
bonds. For example, a hypothetical business, Sunny Beach Vacation Resort (a 
business exposed to risk of loss from hurricanes), will buy hurricane insur-
ance from Extreme Weather Insurance Co.143 Instead of retaining this risk, 
Extreme Weather Insurance Co., known as the “sponsor of the bond,” creates 
an SPV (Extreme Weather Events SPV) to issue catastrophe bonds as a way 
of transferring this risk exposure away from Extreme Weather Insurance Co. 
and onto the capital markets.144 
The terms and conditions of the catastrophe bonds issued by the Ex-
treme Weather Events SPV will provide for the investors (the bondholders) to 
receive interest throughout the life of the bond, and the return of their princi-
pal (the purchase price of the bonds) upon the bonds’ maturity subject to no 
trigger event occurring over the life of the bond.145 If a trigger event occurs, 
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however, the investors will lose some or all of their principal.146 The trigger 
event for a catastrophe bond linked to hurricane risk will be the occurrence of 
a hurricane of a specific magnitude.147 
Upon issuing the bond, the SPV places the bond proceeds (the purchase 
price paid by investors) in a collateral trust.148 The assets of the collateral trust 
are then invested in highly rated securities.149 The Extreme Weather Events 
SPV then uses the insurance premiums it receives from the bond sponsor (Ex-
treme Weather Events Insurance Co.), and the return it receives on the assets 
in the collateral trust, to make periodic interest payments to the bondholders. 
If a trigger event occurs during the term of the bond (i.e., a hurricane of the 
specified magnitude), the SPV liquidates some or all of the assets held in the 
collateral trust and pays that money to the sponsor (Extreme Weather Insur-
ance Co.) pursuant to its insurance contract with the sponsor. That money 
puts the sponsor in funds to cover the loss it has insured (the insurance paya-
ble to Sunny Beach Vacation Resort).150 If no trigger event occurs, the SPV 
liquidates the assets in the collateral trust on the maturity date of the bonds 
and uses them to repay the principal on the bonds to the bondholders.151 
With its issuance of a catastrophe bond on behalf of the CCRIF in 2014, 
the World Bank modified the typical catastrophe bond structure to lower the 
cost for the CCRIF.152 The World Bank catastrophe bond eliminates the need 
for an SPV or a collateral trust.153 Instead, the Bank serves in a role akin to 
that played by the SPV in a traditional catastrophe bond structure, but relies 
on its own balance sheet (not the investment income earned on a specially 
created trust of the bond proceeds) to support the bond interest and principal 
payments.154 Eliminating the need for an SPV and a dedicated pool of collat-
eral reduces the costs of issuing the bond (which would have been borne by 
CCRIF and, ultimately, the countries that are its beneficiaries).155 
The World Bank hedged its risk on the bond by entering into a simulta-
neous swap contract with the CCRIF that mirrors the terms of the catastrophe 
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bond. Under the terms of the swap contract, the Bank receives premiums 
from CCRIF which match the interest payments due to the bondholders. Un-
der the terms of the swap contract, if a trigger event occurs (a hurricane or 
earthquake of specified intensity), the principal amount of the bond will be 
reduced and an equivalent amount will be paid to the CCRIF under the terms 
of the swap. If no such event occurs, the bondholders will receive a payout at 
the end of the three years (the term of the bond).156 
The swap ensures that the Bank’s intervention to facilitate a risk transfer 
by the CCRIF to the capital markets does not expose the Bank’s balance sheet 
itself to risk. Nonetheless, the transaction of the catastrophe bond placed de-
mands on the Bank’s resources, not least of which included the fact that the 
Bank created a new capital-at-risk program to serve as the umbrella for such 
bonds.157 Bonds issued, or to be issued, under the capital-at-risk program may 
be rated less than the World Bank’s own Triple-A rating, or may be unrated to 
take account of the fact that investors in these bonds risk losing the return of 
some or all of their principal if specified risks occur.158 The program is in-
tended to ensure that investors are aware that the catastrophe bond and any 
other bonds issued under the program have a markedly distinct risk profile 
from the Bank’s usual Triple A-rated bonds.159 
III. FUTURE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL MARKET TOOLS FOR CLIMATE RISK 
MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
As the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (“CCRIF”) and 
the World Bank (“the Bank”) catastrophe bond show, sovereign risk insurance 
pools and catastrophe bonds can play a vital role in managing climate risk. 
Thus, development assistance that helps countries to avail of such arrange-
ments is a step towards fulfilling the Sendai Framework and Paris Agreement 
imperatives.160 Looking forward, we must commit to taking bold steps in the 
global effort to combat climate change and manage disaster risk by maintain-
ing a strong link between such assistance and the receipt of commitments 
from beneficiary countries to do their part on risk reduction. 
Forging and enforcing that link will involve intervening in the terms and 
conditions of the insurance contracts that are a key part of the risk coverage 
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that these arrangements provide.161 Intruding on the domain of private order-
ing arrangements such as financial contracts, however, will become an in-
creasingly necessary step in realizing the imperatives of these international 
commitments. The scale of the global climate change challenge, and the ex-
tent of countries’ reliance on the financial sector to raise the resources to ad-
dress it, makes close coordination between global climate change manage-
ment and global economic governance essential. Having development assis-
tance donors influence the terms of coverage offered by future CCRIF-like 
facilities is just one example of the kind of coordination required. 
A. The CCRIF and the World Bank Catastrophe Bond as Role Models 
The CCRIF and the World Bank catastrophe bond fill a void in the de-
velopment assistance landscape. The CCRIF models aggregate sovereign 
climate risk in a way that makes it palatable for the private insurance industry 
to assume the risk and extend coverage.162 The World Bank catastrophe bond 
reinforces that effort. It allows the facility to access private investor demand 
for high yield securities and investors’ willingness to assume a certain amount 
of climate risk as the price of that yield.163 Both interventions enable the 
member countries of the CCRIF to better manage climate risk by transferring 
a portion of that risk to third parties.164 To that extent, both interventions 
achieve their stated goals. To what extent then are these interventions model 
forms of development assistance that we should emulate in the future? 
These interventions model much that is worth emulating, and future in-
terventions should aim for similar goals. Specifically, future interventions 
should condition assistance on firm commitments from the countries that 
benefit from the interventions to undertake climate risk reduction efforts to an 
extent consistent with each beneficiary country’s level of development. In the 
case of assistance to establish a sovereign insurance pool like the CCRIF, this 
conditionality can be included in the terms and conditions of coverage set out 
in the insurance contracts between the countries obtaining coverage and the 
entity providing the coverage, such as the CCRIF. Further, the provider of 
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coverage can be required to monitor beneficiary countries’ compliance with 
their obligations to reduce risk. In turn, assistance in the form of a World 
Bank catastrophe bond, which enables an entity like the CCRIF to access the 
capital markets, can be limited to intermediaries that require and police risk 
reduction from their insureds. 
In creating such a facility, there are two pivotal points where the facili-
ty’s sponsors can seek to impose conditions requiring beneficiary countries to 
undertake risk reduction. The first opportunity to impose such conditions 
arises when funds are raised from donors to cover the facility’s establishment 
costs, operating expenses, and insurance payouts during the first few years of 
its operation.165 The terms of the grant agreements with donors could specify 
that the facility shall require risk reduction by the countries it insures.166 
The second opportunity to require risk reduction measures be taken by 
insured countries is at the point where the facility’s sponsors agree that exter-
nal funds (from the International Development Association (“IDA”), for ex-
ample) should be used to cover the costs of some participant countries’ initia-
tion fees and premiums.167 The grant agreements between the source of the 
external funds and the countries whose initiation and premium fees are being 
paid could mirror any risk reduction requirements included in the insurance 
contracts those countries enter into with the facility.168 
This recommendation is not meant to suggest that countries like the Car-
ibbean countries, which are highly vulnerable to extreme weather events ex-
acerbated by climate change, are to blame for their vulnerability. To the con-
trary, small island countries are primarily victims, not perpetrators, of climate 
change.169 In addition, the recommendation does not seek to place an unfair 
burden on any developing country to develop a disaster risk management plan 
that goes beyond what can reasonably be expected given that country’s level 
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of development. It is clear that developing country governments face many 
competing priorities for their limited budget resources, of which disaster risk 
planning is only one. The objective of the recommendation therefore is not to 
punish countries that are unable to afford to carry out robust disaster risk 
planning, but rather to push all countries to do as much preparedness and re-
siliency planning as is possible given their circumstances. 
At the same time, the threat posed by climate change is so immense, and 
the need for a fundamental change in the kind of development we support and 
encourage so intense, that we need to optimize every opportunity to spur re-
duction efforts.170 There may still be measures that countries like the Carib-
bean countries can reasonably take to improve their resilience and reduce 
their exposure to loss. Further, future development assistance efforts may ap-
ply the CCRIF model and the World Bank catastrophe bond to other countries 
and to other kinds of economic damage beyond geological and meteorologi-
cal catastrophe risk events where greater opportunities for reduction apply. 
In the absence of a tie-in between such arrangements and a commitment 
by the insureds to risk reduction, we risk re-creating the kind of problems that 
the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) caused.171 The U.S. 
Congress created the NFIP in 1968 with the idea, inter alia, of using the car-
rot of federally subsidized flood insurance to encourage local authorities to 
manage development in floodplains.172 With rising sea levels causing an ex-
ponential increase in the risk of flooding, the subsidized insurance now oper-
ates as a perverse incentive that inhibits sound adaptation.173 Under the pro-
gram, homeowners in communities that adopt minimum floodplain regula-
tions are eligible to purchase federal flood insurance at below-market rates.174 
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Unfortunately, the subsidized insurance provides a financial incentive 
for people to develop and redevelop in the same areas where rising sea levels 
now indicate that state and local governments should encourage retreat.175 
The federally-backed flood insurance spreads the risk of flood damage to all 
taxpayers and, therefore, allows property owners to maintain development in 
flood-prone areas without paying the true costs of the risk.176 The private 
market, in contrast, would compel a retreat strategy because, faced with ex-
ponentially higher rates to match the exponential increase in risk, many prop-
erty owners would be forced to relocate out of vulnerable areas.177 
The way in which the NFIP generated perverse incentives serves as a 
warning of the unforeseen consequences that can arise when governments 
subsidize insurance premiums directly (as the CCRIF sponsors did when they 
agreed that the IDA funds could be used to pay some countries’ initiation fees 
and premiums).178 Perverse incentives could also arise when the access of 
governments’ insurers to capital market investors is facilitated by an interna-
tional development bank whose members absorb the set-up and transactional 
costs involved in affording that access. The lesson here is not to deny devel-
opment assistance for risk management. Instead, it is a reminder to link the 
assistance with reduction and other forms of adaptation whenever it is rea-
sonably possible to do so.179 
As demand for disaster insurance increases around the world, and enti-
ties emerge to meet that demand, the World Bank and other international de-
velopment banks will have an opportunity to use the carrot of catastrophe 
bond financing to influence the terms and conditions of the new entity’s in-
surance contracts with its insured. Ensuring that those terms and conditions 
mandate climate risk reduction efforts should be a priority goal.180 
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B. The CCRIF and World Bank Catastrophe Bond in Broader Perspective 
The CCRIF and the World Bank catastrophe bond that supports it are 
just two examples of an arsenal of instruments and approaches that develop-
ing countries need to manage climate risk. Both arrangements have inherent 
limitations. For example, the parametric cover that underlies both arrange-
ments can result in extensive uncovered losses.181 While the parametric struc-
ture allows for rapid payouts, the extent of under-coverage can be a high 
price.182 In addition, both arrangements tie payouts to the occurrence or non-
occurrence of a trigger event.183 Inevitably, this means that there will be times 
when an insured sustains significant loss, with potentially crippling economic 
consequences, but fails to recover because the event falls short of the magni-
tude required to meet the definition of a trigger event.184 
Moreover, the risk transfer process that both arrangements facilitate is 
the last step in a country’s systematic risk management process.185 Before a 
country decides which risks to transfer, it needs to organize itself so as to re-
duce the risks as far as possible, which requires the preliminary step of as-
sessing the scope of the risk.186 Assessing the risk entails data gathering, data 
compilation, processing and analysis, and modeling hazard behavior and asset 
vulnerability.187 Once the country assesses the risk, it then has to divide the 
different aspects of the identified risk into different layers, according to the 
probability of its occurring and the scale of the loss that it will cause.188 To 
know what risk to transfer and how best to transfer it, both the developing 
countries themselves, and the third parties they rely on for reinsurance, need 
access to sophisticated risk modelling, databases, risk assessment programs, 
and information systems. Thus, in addition to helping with risk transfer, we 
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need development assistance to fund the creation of this risk management 
infrastructure.189 
This need has received international attention, but so far inadequate 
funding.190 Signatories of the Sendai Framework urged each other to increase 
their contributions to a United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction.191 
Some years earlier, a Technical Paper on mechanisms to manage the financial 
risks of climate change commissioned by the United Nations Framework 
Convention Climate Change (“UNFCCC” or “Convention”) Secretariat at the 
request of an ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action under 
the Convention made a much more sweeping recommendation.192 The paper 
proposed that donor countries should fund the creation of a global climate 
risk management mechanism that would provide market solutions, stimulate 
risk management, focus efforts to prepare for the adverse effects of climate 
change, and transfer the risk to international markets.193 
The proposal included setting up two new global facilities; a Technical 
Advisory Facility to provide technical assistance to countries on risk model-
ing, findings, and management, and a Financial Vehicle.194 The Financial Ve-
hicle would administer a central pool of resources to be held in a Responsibil-
ity Fund, offer reinsurance to countries, and serve as a channel to the capital 
markets.195 The Responsibility Fund’s resources would come from premiums 
paid by countries for reinsurance and development assistance contribu-
tions.196 
The proposal has not yet been acted upon. The Green Climate Fund, as 
the UNFCCC’s core financing vehicle for climate change, however, could 
create a window to perform similar functions. The relative merits of such a 
centralized effort over de-centralized efforts that emulate features of the 
CCRIF and are supported by development banks and others would need to be 
examined. A 2006 initiative titled the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction 
and Recovery, however, aims to perform some of the functions indicated for 
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the proposed Technical Advisory Facility.197 Originally created to fund devel-
oping countries’ disaster management efforts and to serve as a repository of 
disaster management best practices, it has now expanded its mandate to in-
clude climate risk management.198 Its activities to date, however, fall far short 
of pioneering the kind of comprehensive climate risk management infrastruc-
ture that the Technical Advisory Facility was intended to be.199 But given that 
the Paris Agreement attests to a new sense of urgency about climate risk, per-
haps the time for this need to be met has arrived. The Green Climate Fund 
would be an obvious source to expect to fund the costs of creating such an 
infrastructure. Once in place, the infrastructure will pave the way for more 
widespread use of capital markets to absorb developing country climate risk. 
CONCLUSION 
The ink is barely dry on the Paris Agreement, but “time and tide [and 
other extreme weather events] wait for no man.”200 The Caribbean Catastro-
phe Risk Insurance Facility and the World Bank catastrophe bond offer con-
crete examples of the kinds of arrangements we can use to spread developing 
countries’ climate risk more broadly and transfer it to parties better able to 
absorb it. We need to invest in creating the kind of information infrastructure 
that will enable more expansive use of such arrangements. The time for treat-
ing development setbacks caused by extreme weather events as nasty surpris-
es has long since passed. 
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